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               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
 
INTERNATIONAL PAYMENT 
SERVICES, LLC, a Nevada Limited 
Liability Company, dba ELITEPAY 
GLOBAL,                              Plaintiff,                                             v.  
 
CARDPAYMENTOPTIONS.COM, 
INC., A Texas Corporation; 
PHILLIP PARKER, an individual; 
and DOES 1-10 inclusive,  
                   Defendants. 
))))))))))))))))))))
 CASE NO. 2:14-cv-02604-CBM-JC   ORDER   
 
 
      
 
 
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment and 
Request for Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (the “Motion”).  
(Dkt. No. 22.)  The Motion is fully briefed, and oral arguments were heard.   
I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,  
1338, 1367(a).  
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2
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
Plaintiff is the holder of a registered trademark for “ELITEPAY GLOBAL” 
(the “Mark”) (Declaration of Brian Bentley (“B. Bentley Decl.”) ¶¶ 6, 7, Exs. A, 
B, Dkt. No. 28-4.)  Since at least September 2012, Plaintiff has used the Mark as 
its trade name for its merchant payment solutions equipment, services and training 
business in the credit card processing industry.  (Id. at ¶ 2.)  Plaintiff launched its 
website using the www.elitepayglobal.com domain in or about September 2012 
(“Plaintiff’s Website”).  (Id. at ¶ 3.)  Plaintiff has never granted Defendants 
permission or a license to use the Mark.  (Id. at ¶ 13.)   
Defendant Parker is the CEO and owner of Defendant CPO.  (Id. at ¶ 2.)  
Defendants operate an internet website located at www.CardPaymentOptions.com 
(the “Website”).  (Declaration of Phillip Parker (“Parker Decl.”) ¶ 3, Dkt. No. 22-
2.)  Defendants do not provide credit card processing services.  (Id. at ¶ 10.)  
Defendant CPO is paid by placing advertisements from processors on its Website.  
(Id. at ¶ 6.)  Defendant CPO maintains and publishes a review page regarding 
Plaintiff on the Website (the “Webpage”), wherein Plaintiff’s Mark and logo 
appear under the heading “ElitePay Global Review.”  (Id. at ¶ 8, Ex. B; Complaint 
Ex. D; B. Bentley Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. D.)  “ElitePay Global Logo” is written 
underneath Plaintiff’s logo on the Webpage.  (Parker Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. B; Complaint 
Ex. D; B. Bentley Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. D.)  The Webpage contains a review of Plaintiff 
written by Parker and additional comments or reviews regarding Plaintiff.  (Parker 
Decl. ¶ 8; Parker Depo. at 60-61; Complaint Ex. D; B. Bentley Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. D.)  
Defendants rated Plaintiff’s service with a “C-” grade or 1.875 out of 5 stars on 
the Webpage.  (Complaint Ex. D.)  The Webpage also contains more than 40 
negative comments or reviews about Plaintiff’s services.  (Parker Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. B; 
Complaint Ex. D; B. Bentley Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. D.)  The Website and Webpage 
provide links to the websites of credit card service processors other than Plaintiff.  
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3
(Complaint Ex. D.)    
Defendant CPO previously purchased keyword advertising within Google’s 
search engine results via Google’s “AdWords” program, which caused a labeled 
advertisement and links to Defendants’ Webpage to appear among the sponsored 
results published in response to Google searches for Plaintiff’s trademarked name 
“ElitePay Global.”  (Parker Decl. at ¶¶ 11-12; Complaint Ex. C.)  Defendant CPO 
ceased using AdWords advertising on July 21, 2014.  (Parker Decl. ¶ 11.)   
B. Procedural History 
Plaintiff filed the instant action on April 7, 2014, asserting the following 
thirteen causes of action against Defendants:  (1) Federal Trademark Infringement; 
(2) False Designation of Origin and Unfair Competition in Violation of the 
Lanham Act § 43; (3) Trademark Dilution in Violation of the Lanham Act § 43; 
(4) Common Law Trademark Infringement; (5) Unfair Competition, False 
Designation of Origin, and False Advertising Under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 
14200, 17200 and 17500 et seq.; (6) Injury to Business Reputation and Dilution 
under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 14200 et seq.; (7) Accounting; (8) Involuntary 
Trust of Wrongful Gain; (9) California Unfair Competition, Violation of Cal. Bus. 
& Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17500, 14245; (10) Common Law Misappropriation; (11) 
Unjust Enrichment; (12) Permanent Injunction; and (13) Declaratory Relief.  
Defendants’ Motion seeks summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s causes of 
action.   
On August 26, 2014, the parties filed their Rule 26(f) Joint Report, wherein 
Defendants stated that they expected to file a motion for summary judgment prior 
to November 7, 2014.  (Dkt. No. 18.)  On September 12, 2014, the Court issued a 
scheduling order setting the fact discovery completion date for January 30, 2015, 
the expert discovery completion date for February 28, 2015, and the motion cut-
off date for April 28, 2015.  (Dkt. No. 20.)  Defendants filed the instant Motion on 
September 23, 2014.  (Dkt. No. 22.)  On September 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed an ex 
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parte application for an order continuing the hearing date for Defendants’ Motion, 
which effectively sought to extend Plaintiff’s deadline to file its Opposition to the 
Motion from September 30, 2014, to December 17, 2014, in order to conduct 
additional discovery.1  (Dkt. No. 23.)  The Court issued an order granting 
Plaintiff’s ex parte application and extending the deadline for Plaintiff to file its 
Opposition to November 4, 2014.  (Dkt. No. 26.)  On November 4, 2014, Plaintiff 
filed its Opposition, requesting that the Court deny the Motion or again defer 
briefing on the Motion to permit Plaintiff to conduct additional discovery.  (Dkt. 
No. 28.)   
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must determine whether, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are 
any genuine issues of material fact.  Simo v. Union of Needletrades, Indus. & 
Textile Employees, 322 F.3d 602, 609-10 (9th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.  
Summary judgment against a party is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.  A 
factual dispute is “material” only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under 
governing law.   Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  An 
issue is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a 
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.  Id. at 249. 
The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(e).  In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court does not 
make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence.  T.W. Elec. Serv., 
                                           
1 The additional discovery identified in Plaintiff’s ex parte included deposing 
Defendant Parker and propounding written discovery on Defendants, Google and 
other third parties. 
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5
Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).  Rather, 
“[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences 
are to be drawn in [the nonmovant’s] favor.”  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.  But the 
non-moving party must come forward with more than “the mere existence of a 
scintilla of evidence.”  Id. at 252.   
“Because of the intensely factual nature of trademark disputes, summary 
judgment is generally disfavored in the trademark arena.”  Interstellar Starship 
Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir.1999).  The Ninth Circuit, 
however, has affirmed summary judgment to defendants on trademark 
infringement and related claims based on nominative fair use.  See, e.g., Playboy 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 803-04 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming 
summary judgment to defendant on use of plaintiff’s trademark in her headlines, 
banner advertisements, and metatags for her website upon finding that use 
constituted nominative fair use); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 
971 F.2d 302, 305-09 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming summary judgment to defendants 
on trademark infringement and related claims upon finding that defendants’ use 
was nominative fair use).   
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Request 
Plaintiff’s Opposition requests that the Court deny the Motion or defer 
briefing on the Motion to permit Plaintiff to conduct additional discovery based on 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).  Rule 56(d) provides, “[i]f a nonmovant 
shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts 
essential to justify its opposition, the court may:  (1) defer considering the motion 
or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; 
or (3) issue any other appropriate order.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.  This rule “provides 
a device for litigants to avoid summary judgment when they have not had 
sufficient time to develop affirmative evidence.”  U.S. v. Kitsap Phys. Serv., 314 
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F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir. 2002).  The requesting party must show:  (1) that it has 
set forth in affidavit form the specific facts it hopes to elicit from further 
discovery; (2) the facts sought exist; and (3) the sought-after facts are essential to 
oppose summary judgment.  Grant v. Unifund CCR Partners, 842 F. Supp. 2d 
1234, 1242 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (citing State of Cal. v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 
(9th Cir.1998)).  Failure to comply with these requirements is a proper ground for 
denying discovery and proceeding to summary judgment.  Id. (citation omitted). 
Plaintiff fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 56(d) because it does not 
identify in an affidavit the facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery, nor 
establish that the facts sought exist and are essential to opposing Defendants’ 
Motion.  Plaintiff does not offer any explanation as to why it did not have an 
adequate opportunity to develop discovery to oppose the instant Motion after it 
was put on notice of Defendant’s intent to file the Motion prior to August 2014, 
and after the Court granted Plaintiff more than one month to conduct additional 
discovery to oppose the Motion.  Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Rule 
56(d) request to deny Defendant’s Motion or defer briefing on the Motion to 
permit Plaintiff to conduct additional discovery. 
B. Nominative Fair Use 
Plaintiff asserts causes of action for Federal Trademark Infringement in 
Violation of Lanham Act § 32(1) (First Cause of Action), False Designation of 
Origin and Unfair Competition in Violation of the Lanham Act § 43 (Second 
Cause of Action), Trademark Dilution in Violation of the Lanham Act § 43 (Third 
Cause of Action), and Common Law Trademark Infringement (Fourth Cause of 
Action). 
When a defendant uses another’s trademark to refer to the trademarked 
good itself, this use is called nominative fair use and does not constitute trademark 
infringement.  Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175 
(9th Cir. 2010).  See also New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 309 (affirming 
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summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s common law trademark 
infringement, and Lanham Act false advertising, false designation of origin and 
unfair competition causes of action upon finding that defendants’ use of the mark 
was purely nominative); Playboy, 279 F.3d at 805-06 (nominative fair use is 
excepted from anti-dilution law because “nominative uses, by definition, do not 
dilute the trademarks”).2  The nominative fair use defense applies where:  (1) the 
product is not “readily identifiable” without use of the mark; (2) defendants did 
not use more of the mark than necessary; and (3) defendants do not falsely suggest 
they were sponsored or endorsed by the trademark holder.  Id. at 1175-76 
(citations omitted).  This three-factor test is “designed to evaluate likelihood of 
confusion.”  Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1109 
(9th Cir.1999).  Defendants seeking to assert nominative fair use defense “need 
only show that [they] used the mark to refer to the trademarked good. . . .  The 
burden then reverts to the plaintiff to show a likelihood of confusion.”  Tabari, 
610 F.3d at 1182-83 (citations omitted).   
Defendants use Plaintiff’s Mark to refer to Plaintiff’s services and not to 
Defendants’ own products or services.  (Parker Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. B; Complaint Ex. D; 
B. Bentley Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. D.)  Thus, the nominative fair use analysis applies.  See 
Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he 
nominative fair use analysis is appropriate . . . where a defendant has used the 
plaintiff’s mark to describe the plaintiff’s product,” whereas the “classic fair use 
analysis is appropriate where a defendant has used the plaintiff’s mark only to 
                                           
2 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) provides that nominative fair use of a famous mark by 
another person other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or 
services is not actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment, 
including use in connection with (i) “advertising or promotion that permits 
consumers to compare goods or services;” or (ii) “identifying and parodying, 
criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services 
of the famous mark owner.” 
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describe his own product, and not at all to describe the plaintiff’s product.”) 
(Emphasis in original.).3   
1. Whether Plaintiff’s Services Were Not “Readily Identifiable” 
Without Use of the Mark 
The first prong of the nominative use test analyzes whether Plaintiff’s 
services were readily identifiable without use of the Mark.  Tabari, 610 F.3d at 
1175-76.  Defendants use Plaintiff’s Mark and logo to identify Plaintiff in reviews 
and comments on the Webpage regarding Plaintiff’s services.  (Parker Decl. ¶ 8, 
Ex. B; Complaint Ex. D; B. Bentley Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. D.)  Defendants’ referential 
use of Plaintiff’s Mark to review and criticize Plaintiff’s services are not readily 
identifiable without use of Plaintiff’s Mark.  See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308; J.K. 
Harris & Co., LLC v. Kassel, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2003).  
Defendants also used Plaintiff’s Mark as part of its Google AdWords campaign 
which caused a labeled advertisement and links to Defendants’ Webpage to appear 
among the sponsored results published in response to Google searches for 
Plaintiff’s trademarked name “ElitePay Global.”  (Parker Decl. at ¶¶ 11-12; 
Complaint Ex. C.)  There was no substitute for Plaintiff’s Mark for Defendants’ 
Google AdWords campaign.  See Playboy, 279 F.3d at 804.   
The first prong of the nominative fair use test is therefore met because 
Plaintiff’s services were not readily identifiable without use of the Mark.  See New 
Kids, 971 F.2d at 308; Playboy, 279 F.3d at 804; J.K. Harris, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 
1127. 
                                           
3 The Court rejects Plaintiff’s contention that the nominative fair use defense is 
simply a likelihood of confusion substitute, and that the classic fair use analysis 
therefore applies in the instant case.  See Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1150 (“[T]he classic 
fair use analysis only complements the likelihood of customer confusion analysis 
set forth in [AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979)], whereas 
the nominative fair use analysis replaces the Sleekcraft analysis.”) (Emphasis in 
original.).   
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2. Whether Use of Plaintiff’s Mark Was “More than Necessary”  
The second prong of the nominative use test analyzes whether Defendants’ 
use of the Mark was more than necessary.  Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1175-76.  “What is 
‘reasonably necessary to identify the plaintiff’s product’ differs from case to 
case.”  Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1154.  “Where . . . the description of the defendant’s 
product depends on the description of the plaintiff’s product, more use of the 
plaintiff’s trademark is reasonably necessary to identify the plaintiff’s product 
than in cases where the description of the defendant’s product does not depend on 
the description of the plaintiff’s product.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
Plaintiff relies on evidence that its Mark is used over 50 times on 
Defendants’ Webpage in arguing that Defendants’ use of the Mark is so excessive 
that it does not constitute nominative fair use.  (B. Bentley Decl. ¶ 45.)  
Defendants, however, used Plaintiff’s Mark to refer to Plaintiff’s services in 
reviews and comments published on the Webpage.  (Parker Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. B; 
Complaint Ex. D; B. Bentley Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. D.)  In J.K. Harris, the district court 
found that evidence that defendants’ website contained “frequent references” to 
Plaintiff’s trademarked name did not cause defendants’ use of the mark to be 
gratuitous and therefore fall outside the scope of the nominative fair use, where 
the defendants referred to J.K. Harris by name on their website in order to make 
statements about it.  253 F. Supp. 2d at 1127.  The court found that “[t]his 
referential use of Plaintiff's trade mark is exactly what the nominative fair use 
doctrine is designed to allow.”  Id.  Likewise, Plaintiff’s evidence that Defendants 
used Plaintiff’s Mark more than 50 times in reviews and comments about Plaintiff 
on Defendants’ Webpage merely demonstrates referential use of Plaintiff’s Mark, 
not gratuitous use.  Id. 
With respect to Defendants’ use of the Mark in its Google AdWords 
campaign, Plaintiff submits evidence that Defendants’ Webpage has on occasion 
appeared above Plaintiff’s Website in Google search results for the Mark during 
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the past two years but fails to present evidence of how often that has occurred.4  
(Compare Complaint Ex. C (Defendants’ Webpage appears below Plaintiff’s 
Website) and B. Bentley Decl. Ex. C (same) with B. Bentley Decl. ¶ 30, Ex. G 
(link to Plaintiff’s Website appears below Defendant’s Webpage in Google 
organic search results on September 30, 2014.)  In Playboy, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the defendant’s use of Playboy’s trademark in metatags (i.e., hidden code 
used by search engines to determine the content of websites in order to direct 
searchers to relevant sites) was not more than necessary.  279 F.3d at 803-04.  In 
affirming summary judgment to the defendants on the infringement claims as to 
their use of metatags with plaintiff’s mark, the Circuit noted that its decision that 
the defendant’s use of metatags constituted nominative fair use “might differ if the 
metatags listed the trademarked term so repeatedly that [defendant’s] site would 
regularly appear above [plaintiff’s] in searches for one of the trademarked terms.”  
Id. at 804 (emphasis added).  Since Plaintiff does not present evidence that 
Defendants’ Webpage regularly appears above Plaintiff’s Website in Google 
search results, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether 
Defendants’ use of the Mark in its Google AdWords advertising was more than 
necessary.  Id. 
The second prong of the nominative fair use test is therefore met because 
Defendants’ use of Plaintiff’s Mark in both its Google AdWords advertising and 
                                           
4 The Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff’s application to file under seal 
Exhibit A to the Declaration of Douglas Timm (“Timm”) based on Plaintiff’s 
failure to make a good cause showing to seal the document (the “Seal Order”).  
(Dkt. No. 37.)  The Seal Order denied the application without prejudice to being 
refiled with a good cause showing, and stated that Exhibit A would be publicly 
filed unless retrieved by Plaintiff.  Plaintiff retrieved Exhibit A and did not 
subsequently file it with the Court.  (Dkt. No. 41)  Accordingly, there is no Exhibit 
A before the Court.  Timm’s Declaration, which purports to describe the contents 
of Exhibit A, is inadmissible hearsay and lacks foundation, and will not be 
considered by the Court in ruling on the Motion. 
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on Defendants’ Webpage in reviews of Plaintiff’s services do not constitute more 
than necessary use falling outside the scope of nominative fair use.  See Playboy, 
279 F.3d at 803-04; J.K. Harris, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 1127. 
3. Whether Defendants Suggested Endorsement or Sponsorship By 
Plaintiff 
The last prong of the nominative use test analyzes whether Defendants 
falsely suggest they were sponsored or endorsed by Plaintiff, the trademark 
holder.  Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1175-76.  It is undisputed that Defendants rated 
Plaintiff’s service with a “C-” grade or 1.875 out of 5 stars, and that negative 
comments and reviews about Plaintiff’s services are posted on the Website.  
(Complaint Ex. D.)  In New Kids, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment 
for defendants, finding that nothing in the newspapers’ announcements suggested 
joint sponsorship or endorsement by New Kids On the Block, particularly where 
one announcement asked whether New Kids On the Block might be “a turn off.”  
971 F.2d at 308-09.  See also J.K. Harris, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 (“A reasonable 
consumer would not believe that Plaintiff is the sponsor of this negative 
publicity”).  For the same reasons, reference to Plaintiff’s Mark in negative 
commentary and reviews on Defendants’ Webpage is not indicative of 
sponsorship and endorsement.5   
As to Defendants’ use of the Mark in its Google AdWords campaign and 
domain name (www.cardpaymentoptions.com/credit-card-processors/elitepay-
global/), Plaintiff does not present any evidence that such use actively claims 
affiliation with or sponsorship by Plaintiff.  The Ninth Circuit has recognized that 
“[o]utside the special case of trademark.com, or domains that actively claim 
                                           
5 Plaintiff argues that it is possible that a reasonable consumer would believe that 
Defendants’ Webpage was endorsed by Plaintiff because “there is no such thing as 
bad publicity.”  The Court rejects this argument.  See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308-
09; J.K. Harris, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 1125. 
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affiliation with the trademark holder, consumers don’t form any firm expectations 
about the sponsorship of a website until they’ve seen the landing page,” and that 
“[s]o long as the site as a whole does not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by 
the trademark holder, . . . momentary uncertainty does not preclude a finding of 
nominative fair use”).  Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1179.  See also Playboy, 279 F.3d at 
804 (finding that the third nominative use factor was met where nothing was done 
with defendant’s use of plaintiff’s trademark in its metatags to suggest 
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder).   
The third prong of the nominative fair use test is therefore met because 
there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants falsely suggest 
they were sponsored or endorsed by Plaintiff.  See Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1175-76, 
1179; Playboy, 279 F.3d at 804; J.K. Harris, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 1125. 
The Court finds that Defendants’ use of Plaintiff’s Mark is nominative fair 
use, and grants summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s federal and 
common law trademark infringement and federal dilution6 claims (i.e., the First, 
Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action).7 
C. Plaintiff’s Other Causes of Action 
1. Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Causes of Action 
Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action (Accounting), Eighth Cause of Action 
(Involuntary Trust of Wrongful Gain), Eleventh Cause of Action (Unjust 
Enrichment), and Twelfth Cause of Action (Permanent Injunction), fail as a matter 
of law because they are not independent causes of action.  See Jordan v. Star Trak 
                                           
6 Plaintiff also fails to provide evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether Defendants’ Webpage identified, criticized, or commented on 
Plaintiff’s services.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s federal dilution claim cannot 
withstand summary judgment.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A). 
7 Because the Court finds that Defendants’ use of the Mark is nominative fair use, 
the Court need not consider evidence of actual customer confusion or conduct the 
likelihood of customer confusion analysis set forth in Sleekcraft.  Cairns, 292 F.3d 
at 1150.   
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Ent., Inc., 2010 WL 454374, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (“An accounting is an 
equitable remedy, not an independent cause of action.”) (citations omitted); In re 
Am. Principals Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 1987 WL 39746, at *16 (S.D. Cal. July 
9, 1987) (constructive trust is an involuntary trust); Jordan v. Star Trak Ent., Inc., 
No. CV 09-5123 RSWL FMGX, 2010 WL 454374, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) 
(“A constructive trust is not an independent cause of action but merely a type of 
remedy.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); In re Toyota Motor Corp. 
Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Products Liab. Litig., 754 F. 
Supp. 2d 1145, 1193 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (unjust enrichment is not an independent 
cause of action); Kassahun v. JPMorgan Chase Nat. Corporate Servs., Inc., No. 
SACV 11-1956 DOC, 2012 WL 1378659, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2012) (“An 
injunction is a remedy, not a cause of action.”) (citations omitted).  Accordingly, 
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Seventh, Eighth, 
Eleventh, and Twelfth Causes of Action.   
2. Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Causes of Action 
Plaintiff’s counsel identified at the hearing that Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of 
Action (Unfair Competition, False Designation of Origin and False Advertising 
Under California Business and Professions Code §§ 14200, 17200, and 17500 et 
seq.), Sixth Cause of Action (Injury to Business Reputation and Dilution under 
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 14200 et seq.), and Ninth Cause of Action (California 
Unfair Competition, Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17500, 14245) 
(collectively, the “State Law Claims”) would survive the nominative use defense.  
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Tenth Cause of Action (Common Law Misappropriation)8 
                                           
8 See also Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(finding that the tort of misappropriation does not extend to trademark 
infringement and affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s common law misappropriation 
claim); Bell v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1262 (S.D. Cal. 
2008) (adopting Toho in finding that “California’s common law doctrine of 
misappropriation does not apply to trademark infringement,” and granting 
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and Thirteenth Cause of Action (Declaratory Relief)9 are dismissed with prejudice.  
In reviewing the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, it is unclear that the 
nominative fair use defense would apply to the entire cause of action for each of 
Plaintiff’s State Law Claims.  The Court therefore declines to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State Law Claims, which are dismissed 
without prejudice to being filed in state court. 
D. Attorneys’ Fees 
Defendants request an award of attorneys’ fees under 15.U.S.C. § 1117(a).  
Section 1117(a) limits an award of attorney’s fees to “exceptional cases.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1117(a).  The Ninth Circuit has recognized that a case is “exceptional” 
where the case is “groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in bad faith.”  
Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1156 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).  The Court 
finds that this case does not fall within the narrow class of exceptional cases in 
which attorneys’ fees awards are appropriate.  Accordingly, the Court denies 
Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).   
V. CONCLUSION 
 The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) request.   
The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to 
Plaintiff’s First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, and Twelfth 
                                                                                                                                       
summary judgment to defendants on the California common-law misappropriation 
claims). 
9 Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment finding that:  (1) Defendants have 
infringed on Plaintiff’s Mark; and (2) “Plaintiff is the sole owner of all intellectual 
property at issue in this case.”  (Complaint ¶ 100.)  Plaintiff cannot withstand 
summary judgment on either declaratory relief theory.  See Shoemaker v. 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ., 87 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(affirming dismissal of declaratory relief claim where district court dismissed 
underlying claims); Hunt v. U.S. Bank N.A., 593 F. App’x 730, 732 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(affirming dismissal of declaratory relief claim where plaintiffs failed to show the 
existence of a present, actual controversy). 
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Causes of Action.  Judgment will be entered in favor of Defendants as to 
Plaintiff’s First, Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action based on the 
nominative fair use defense, and Plaintiff’s Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, and 
Twelfth Causes of Action which are not independent causes of action.   
Plaintiff’s Tenth and Thirteenth Causes of Action are dismissed with 
prejudice.  (See supra fn. 8, 9.)  Plaintiff’s State Law Claims (Fifth, Sixth, and 
Ninth Causes of Action) are dismissed without prejudice to being filed in state 
court.   
The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 15 
U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
  
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
   DATED:  June 5, 2015.                                                                       Honorable Consuelo B. Marshall        United States District Judge 
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